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Abstract
When consumers only see prices once they visit stores, and some consumers have time
to comparison shop, co-location commits stores to compete and lower prices, which draws
consumers away from isolated stores. Profits of co-located firms are a single-peaked function
of the number of shoppers—co-located firms thrive when there are some shoppers, but not
too many. When consumers know in advance whether they have time to shop, effects are
enhanced: co-located stores may draw enough shoppers to drive the expected price paid by
a non-shopper below that paid when consumers do not know if they will have time to shop.
1 Introduction
Lincoln Square Mall (LSM), built in Urbana in the mid 1960s, was one of the first down-
town fully-enclosed malls in the United States. Since then, a series of three “anchor” de-
partment stores and two groceries failed, and since 1999, no major store has located there
(http://deadmalls.com/malls/lincoln square mall.html). Standard spatial theories of firm
competition suggest that the stores should have thrived: LSM is located at a prime population
center, and there were no nearby competing stores—these stores had local monopoly power.
In sharp contrast, at the northern tip of neighboring Champaign, far from population
centers, Walmart and Meijer profitably co-exist on opposing sides of the same street, as do
Lowes and Home Depot. Standard theory suggests that competition between closely-located
firms selling almost identical products should drive their profits down. In the canonical spa-
tial model (Tirole 2001, p. 281), an increase in market share from locating closer to a rival is
more than offset by the heightened price competition—firms do best to separate maximally.
Why then despite violating this prescription, have Walmart and Meijer thrived? The
phenomena illustrated by these anecdotes is widespread. A large literature highlights the
hollowing out of town centers (e.g., Iaria 2014), and of strongly competing firms successfully
co-locating at strip malls (e.g., Page and Tessier 2007), with policy responses seeking to
offset this (e.g., the 1996 Town Centres First policy in England).
Our paper asks: when do co-located firms selling identical products thrive? In our spa-
tial model, one firm is located at one end of a line, and two firms are located at the other.
Were consumers to see prices before making shopping decisions, competition between the co-
located firms would drive their prices down to marginal cost, while the isolated firm would
set a higher price and profit from closely-located consumers. However, in practice, most
consumers only see the actual prices once they enter a store. But, then the isolated firm’s
customers are, in effect, captured, leading the isolated firm to monopoly price. In contrast,
co-located firms compete on price to attract a greater share of consumers who shop there:
with unobserved prices, co-location serves to commit firms to lower prices, which makes
consumers willing to travel further to shop. Our paper characterizes how price competition
between the co-located firms—which hinges on the attribute composition of consumers who
go to the cluster—interacts with the price-elasticity of shopping decisions that determines
consumer shopping location choices to determine the profits of isolated and co-located firms.
In our model, some consumers who visit the co-located stores have time to comparison
1
shop, and buy at the store offering the lower price, while the others only have time to visit one
store. Competition for comparison shoppers causes the co-located stores to adopt mixed pric-
ing strategies, offering stochastically greater price improvement when the share of comparison
shoppers is higher (Stahl 1989). Lower travel costs make more-distantly located consumers
willing to go to the co-located stores, raising their profits at the expense of the isolated store.
Thus, secular declines in travel costs can drive the observed downward spiral in the profits
of a town-center store, and increase profits of competing stores that co-locate far away.
The economics are far more subtle than just what this observation suggests, hinging on
how many consumers comparison shop. To see why, observe that if no one has time to com-
parison shop, then the co-located stores monopoly price, each earning half the profit of the
isolated store. We prove that from this base, as one increases the fraction of consumers who
are “shoppers”, profits of co-located stores always rise even though they compete more aggres-
sively on price. With few shoppers, distance is the primary determinant of where individuals
shop. As a result, the measure of consumers drawn to the cluster by increased price compe-
tition is initially very elastic—the marginal consumers have similar travel costs regardless of
where they go. Thus, the price competition due to more shoppers draws enough customers to
more than offset the reduced profit per customer, causing co-located firm profits to rise. We
identify conditions under which profits of co-located stores are a concave, single-peaked func-
tion of the fraction of consumers who are shoppers. However, as the proportion of shoppers
goes to one, co-located stores compete all profits away, earning less than the isolated store.
Thus, co-located stores thrive when there are some comparison shoppers, but not too many.
Our base setting considers consumers who choose where to go before learning whether
they have time to comparison shop. This eases analysis at the possible expense of realism.
We then consider the possibility that consumers know whether they have time to compari-
son shop before choosing where to go. When this is so, the share of shoppers at the cluster
rises because shoppers have more to gain—they always go to the store offering the lowest
price. In turn, this enhances price competition between co-located firms, which draws more
consumers overall. We identify conditions under which even a consumer who knows he lacks
time to comparison shop is more willing to go to the cluster than when consumers do not
know whether they will have time to shop prior to making travel decisions. In particular,
when there are few shoppers in the population, the expected price paid by a consumer who
knows he is a non-shopper falls below that paid by consumers who do not know whether
they will have time to shop, and hence might turn out to be shoppers.
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Literature. The vast spatial industrial organization literature in which greater spatial sep-
aration enhances firm profit is well-known. Our model builds on the search-cost literature
that gives rise to price dispersion (Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989, 1996; Ellison and
Ellison, 2009; Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012; Ronanye 2017). Armstrong (2016) surveys recent
advances in directed search models with heterogeneous sellers. Our paper integrates spatial
features to costly search models and investigates the consequences of information structures
for consumers (what they know about prices and their abilities to search when making shop-
ping decisions). Constantinou and Bernhardt (2018) show how, when consumers do not see
prices before making shopping decisions, firms may have incentives to offer price-matching
guarantees that result in a prisoner’s dilemma in which guarantees hurt all firms.
Fischer and Harrington (1996) spawned an agglomeration literature in which firms selling
heterogeneous products can either co-locate or locate far from each other, when consumers
do not know their product valuations before visiting a store. They argue that firms selling
more differentiated products have greater incentives to co-locate. Subsequent work by Non
(2010) and Parakhonyak and Titova (2018) identifies trade-offs between margins and traffic
in the presence of search costs when consumers have identical travel costs.1 Parakhonyak and
Titova analyze a directed search, matching model with differentiated goods, multiple clusters,
and consumers with identical search costs. Bigger clusters offer greater variety and lower
prices, so they are searched first, allowing them to earn higher profits. Non compares cluster-
ing vs isolation when shoppers can costlessly search all firms, and non-shoppers incur fixed
travel and store-entering costs. In contrast to these papers, we focus on the spatial travel
structure that is central to town-center considerations, analyzing how consumers’ search
and location characteristics influence the profits of the isolated and co-located firms. In our
model, stores selling identical products cluster, and the heterogeneous travel costs of different
consumers that underlie the price elasticity of shopping decisions drive equilibrium outcomes.
2 Model
A continuum of consumers, indexed by their locations x, is uniformly distributed on the unit
interval. Three profit-maximizing stores sell a homogeneous good. Stores L1 and L2 are
co-located at 0, and store R is located at 1. Marginal costs of production are normalized
to zero. Consumers choose whether to go to location 0 or 1, and when there, how much to
1See also Dudey (1990), and Page and Tassier (2007) who build an ‘ecological model’ of location
dynamics in which firms co-locate because they ‘fit together’ for some reason.
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buy. Traveling distance d costs αt(d), with α > 0, t(0) = 0, and t′(·) > 0, t′′(·), t′′′(·) ≥ 0.
Consumers do not see prices set by stores until they visit. Fraction µ ∈ [0, 1] of consumers
are shoppers who have time to costlessly visit both co-located stores and purchase from the
store offering the lower price. The remaining fraction 1− µ are non-shoppers who only have
time to visit one store. Each consumer has a continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing
demand D(p). We assume that revenues R(p) = pD(p) are strictly concave with a global
maximum at the monopoly price pm. Consumer surplus at price pm is assumed to be high
enough that even consumers located at one-half want to visit a store; and we assume that
consumer surplus given price 0 is finite.
When stores L1 and L2 set prices p1 and p2 and store R sets pR, a shopper who travels dis-
tance x to location 0 gets payoff max{∫∞
p1
D(p)dp,
∫∞
p2
D(p)dp}−αt(x), while a non-shopper
who visits Li gets
∫∞
pi
D(p)dp−αt(x), and a customer who visits R gets ∫∞
pR
D(p)dp−αt(1−x).
Timing. First, stores set (unobserved) prices and consumers select shopping locations. Con-
sumers who go to location 0 learn whether they are shoppers: shoppers search both L1 and
L2, see prices and make purchases; non-shoppers (possibly randomly) select a store, see price
and then make purchases. Consumers who visit store R see price and then make purchases.
Strategies. A (possibly mixed) strategy of store j ∈ {L1, L2, R} is a cdf Fj(p) over the price
set p ∈ [0,∞). A strategy for consumer is a function mapping her location x into a choice
of where to shop, and a probability of going to firm L1 if she is a non-shopper at location 0.
We focus on symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibria in which stores L1 and L2 employ
the same pricing strategy F (p) = F1(p) = F2(p), and non-shoppers at location 0 mix with
equal probability over which store to visit. Thus, store R charges the monopoly price pm,
and collects revenue Rm ≡ R(pm) from each of its customers.
We begin with a lemma characterizing pricing by co-located stores. Their pricing strategy
depends on the share of shoppers at location 0. Because consumers choose location before
knowing their types, the fraction of shoppers is µ. This result mirrors that in Stahl (1989).
Lemma 1 (Stahl 1989) In any symmetric equilibrium, if µ ∈ (0, 1), then stores at location
0 use a mixed pricing strategy over p ∈ [b, pm] with cumulative distribution function:
F (p) = 1−
[(
1− µ
2µ
)(
Rm
R(p)
− 1
)]
,
where b is the unique solution to R(b) =
[
1−µ
1+µ
]
R(pm). If µ = 0, then both stores set p = pm;
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if µ = 1, then both stores set p = 0.2
Let A(µ) be the consumer surplus gain from visiting the co-located stores rather than
store R:
A(µ) =
∫ pm
b(µ)
F (p;µ)D(p)dp+ µ
∫ pm
b(µ)
F (p;µ)(1− F (p;µ))D(p)dp. (1)
The first term is the consumer surplus that all consumers (both shoppers and non-shoppers)
gain because cluster stores charge less than the monopoly price. The second term is the
added surplus that shoppers get because when one store has a lower price than the other,
shoppers buy at the lower price.
A consumer located at x goes to location 0 if and only if
A(µ) ≥ α T (x), where T (x) ≡ t(x)− t(1− x).
Let α(µ) = A(µ)/t(1) > 0 be the upper bound on travel costs such that all customers go to
the cluster. Thus, the marginal consumer going to location 0 is located at
x∗(µ, α) =
{
1 ; α ≤ α(µ)
T−1(A(µ)/α) ; α > α(µ).
Because T (x) and A(µ) are increasing, x∗(µ, α) is increasing in µ and decreasing in α. With
no shoppers, x∗(0, α) = T−1(A(0)/α) = T−1(0) = 1/2.
We now compare the profits of the monopolist and cluster stores. The monopolist gets
piR = (1− x∗)Rm.
Because cluster stores use a mixed strategy, a cluster store’s expected profit must be the same
at all prices prescribed by that strategy, including the monopoly price pm. But if a cluster
store charges pm, only non-shoppers who visit that store first will buy. A fraction x∗(µ, α)
of all consumers arrive at co-located stores, a fraction (1− µ) of them will be non-shoppers,
and half of them will visit each store. Thus, the expected profit of a co-located store is
piL(p
m) = x∗(µ, α)
1− µ
2
Rm.
The profit of a cluster store exceeds that of the monopolist (piL(p
m) > piR) if and only if
x∗(α, µ) >
2
3− µ ∈ (2/3, 1). (2)
2Rosenthal (1980) and Varian (1980) derive related mixing pricing results in environments where some
consumers know prices at all stores and other consumers are captive.
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The inequality looks simple because the complexities of search and profit maximization by
firms are embedded in x∗, which depends on A(µ), which, in turn, depends on F (p) in
Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 (1) Increases in the share of shoppers (µ) raise a cluster store’s profit piL(µ)
when there are few shoppers (µ ≈ 0), but reduces its profit when there are many shoppers
(µ ≈ 1). When demand is linear, piL(µ) is a concave, single-peaked function of µ.
(2) For any µ ∈ (0, 1), there exists an α(µ) ∈ (0, α(µ)), such that the profit of a co-located
store is strictly higher than that of the isolated store if and only if α < α(µ). When demand
is linear, α(µ) is a single-peaked function of µ.
Increasing the share µ of consumers who are shoppers has two effects on cluster store
profits. The direct effect is to reduce their profits by increasing their competition with each
other. The indirect effect is to draw more customers away from isolated store R. In sum,
more shoppers raise competition at the cluster, but reduce the external competition since
it decreases the travel price elasticity of the indifferent consumer x∗(α, µ) — location of
x∗(α, µ) pushed closer to R.
The proposition shows that the strategic effect dominates when there are few shoppers—
increasing the proportion of shoppers raises co-located store profits by increasing their in-
centives to undercut each other, which, in turn, draws more consumers. If no one has time
to comparison shop, the co-located firms monopoly price, each earning half the profit of
isolated firm R. From this base, increasing the number of shoppers always raises profits of
cluster firms precisely because they compete more aggressively on price. With few shoppers,
distance is the key determinant of where individuals go, and the marginal consumers have
similar travel costs regardless of where they shop. As a result, the measure of consumers
drawn to the cluster by increased price competition is initially very elastic, even though
pricing remains close to monopoly. This price competition due to more shoppers draws
enough customers to more than offset the second-order reduced profit per customer, causing
the profits of co-located stores to rise. When, instead, almost all consumers are shoppers,
pricing approaches marginal costs at the cluster, and their profits go to zero.
Known Types. We now analyze a more realistic scenario in which consumers know whether
they have time to comparison shop before deciding whether to go to isolated store R or the
co-located stores, and show how qualitative findings are altered. To ease analysis, we assume:
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Assumption 1 Travel costs are linear or quadratic, t(x) = αx or t(x) = αx2.
Assumption 2 (Stahl 1989) p R′(p)/ R2(p) is decreasing.
If the co-located stores believe that a fraction µ′ of their customers are shoppers, then
their pricing is given by Lemma 1 with distribution F (p, µ′) and boundary b(µ′), which de-
pend on µ′, not µ; however, as shown below, the equilibrium value of µ′ is a determined by
µ and travel cost parameter α.
A shopper located at x goes to location 0 if and only if
As(µ
′) =
∫ pm
b(µ′)
[
1− (1− F (p;µ′))2]D(p)dp ≥ αT (x) = α(2x− 1), (3)
and a non-shopper located at x goes to location 0 if and only if
An(µ
′) =
∫ pm
b(µ′)
F (p;µ′)D(p)dp ≥ αT (x). (4)
All consumers collect the same consumer surplus from going to store R. However, shoppers
gain more surplus than non-shoppers from going to location 0, i.e., As(µ
′) > An(µ′), as shop-
pers pay the lowest price. That is, 1− (1− F (p;µ′))2 > F (p;µ′). Lemma 2 follows directly.
Lemma 2 There exist s(µ′, α) and n(µ′, α) ≥ 1
2
such that a shopper located at x goes to
location 0 if and only if x ≤ s(µ′, α), and a non-shopper goes if and only if x ≤ n(µ′, α).
Further, more shoppers visit the co-located stores: s(µ′, α) ≥ max{n(µ′, α), x∗(µ, α)}.
Shoppers have more incentive to go to location 0 than non-shoppers and unknown types.
From (3) and (4), the indifferent shopper s(µ′, α) and non-shopper n(µ′, α) are given by
s(µ′, α) =
α + As(µ
′)
2α
and n(µ′, α) =
α + An(µ
′)
2α
(indifference conditions). (5)
In equilibrium, beliefs are consistent with strategies. Thus, the fraction of consumers at
location 0 who are shoppers is
µ′(µ, α) =
µ
µ+ (1− µ) n(µ′, α)/s(µ′, α) (belief consistency). (6)
Definition 1 An equilibrium is given by a belief–price distribution pair, {µ′ ≡ µ∗(µ, α), F (p, µ′)},
that satisfy equations (5) and (6). At µ∗(µ, α), denote s∗(µ, α) ≡ s(µ∗(µ, α), α) and n∗(µ, α) ≡
n(µ∗(µ, α), µ).
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A lower ratio of the indifferent marginal non-shopper to the indifferent marginal shopper
(n(µ′, α)/s(µ′, α)) raises the ratio of shoppers to non-shoppers (µ′) at the co-located stores,
reducing prices—in the sense of the first order stochastic dominance. Lower prices, in turn,
increase the incentives of all consumers to visit the co-located stores. Conversely, if shoppers
respond more sharply than non-shoppers to reductions in prices at the co-located stores, the
ratio of shoppers to non-shoppers rises at the co-located stores (n/s falls, so that µ′ rises).
Thus, we can think of the game as one between a representative co-located store, which
chooses prices, and a representative consumer who chooses n/s. The actions of the represen-
tative co-located store and representative consumer feature strategic complements, and the
question is whether those strategic complementarities can result in multiple equilibria—e.g.,
an equilibrium in which relatively few shoppers go to location zero, resulting in relatively
high prices, and confirming the optimality of relatively few shoppers going to location zero;
and an equilibrium in which the opposite holds.
We next establish that shoppers are never so much more sensitive to price changes than
non-shoppers that multiple equilibria can arise.
Proposition 2 A unique equilibrium exists. Also, µ∗(µ, α), s∗(µ, α) and n∗(µ, α) weakly
increase in µ and decrease in α, strictly so for s∗(µ, α) < 1. As travel costs rise, the ratio of
shoppers to non-shoppers visiting the co-located stores falls: s∗(µ, α)/n∗(µ, α) decreases in α.
The proof uses Assumption 2 to bound the relative gains from being a shopper. The gain
associated with being a shopper—more choice—is greatest for low prices with the lowest
probability (i.e., prices close to b(µ′)). This reflects that As(µ′)− An(µ′) =
∫ pm
b(µ′)[F (p;µ
′)−
F (p;µ′)2]D(p)dp, whose argument takes the form z − z2, which has a derivative 1− 2z that
decreases in z. Assumption 2 bounds the degree of convexity of demand, which captures the
marginal benefit associated with getting a lower price, and hence the relative sensitivity of
shoppers vs. non-shoppers to the improved prices associated with an increased µ′.
The proposition continues to establish that as the population share µ of shoppers rises,
so does the proportion µ∗(µ, α) of consumers at the cluster who are shoppers. In turn, prices
at the cluster fall in a first order stochastic dominance sense, inducing both more shoppers
and non-shoppers to visit the cluster. Conversely, increasing travel costs, α, reduces the
shopping price elasticity, increasing the impact of consumer location on the choice of where
to shop, reducing the share of shoppers at the cluster.
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As before, the profit of a cluster store is
piL(p
m) = n∗(µ, α)
1− µ
2
Rm, (7)
while the isolated store earns
piR = (1− µs∗(µ, α)− (1− µ)n∗(µ, α))Rm. (8)
Since s∗(µ, α) and n∗(µ, α) increase in µ, the isolated store R’s profit falls in µ. Indeed, store
R is hurt if consumers know their types before deciding where to shop: it collects the same
profit per consumer but its consumer base falls, i.e., µs∗(µ, α)+(1−µ)n∗(µ, α) > x(µ, α) for
µ > 0. This reflects that the co-located stores draw a higher mix of shoppers when consumers
know their own types, leading to stochastically better prices, and hence more consumers.
Figure 1: A(µ)/An(µ
∗(µ)) with linear demand D(p) = β − (β/2)p.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.92
0.96
1
1.04
µ
A
An
α = 1/2
α = 1/4
The profits of co-located stores are higher when consumers know whether they are shop-
pers at the outset than when they do not if and only if n∗(µ, α) > x(µ, α).
Proposition 3 A cluster store’s profit (piL) increases in µ if there are few shoppers (µ ≈ 0),
but decreases if there are many shoppers (µ ≈ 1).
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If there are few shoppers (µ ≈ 0), then more non-shoppers than unknown types visit
the cluster: n(µ∗, α) > x(µ, α). Conversely, if there are many shoppers (µ ≈ 1), then
n∗(µ, α) < x(µ, α).
Figure 1 depicts A(µ)/An(µ
∗(µ, α)) for different values of µ and α, for linear demand
D(p) = β − (β/2)p. A single-crossing property holds: there exists a µ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that
A(µ) < An(µ
∗(µ, α)) if and only if µ < µ¯, a stronger statement than Proposition 3, which
only requires, via Assumption 2, that the demand not be too convex.
For co-located stores, similar direct (increased price competition) and indirect effects
(reduced external competition) exist as in our base setting via the positive effect of µ on
µ∗(µ, α). Once more, a cluster store’s profit first rises in µ when there are few shoppers,
reflecting the high sensitivity to increased price competition of a consumer’s choice of where
to shop when travel distances to stores are very similar. The proposition reveals that the
qualitative implications are reinforced if consumers know in advance whether they have time
to comparison shop. In fact, with few shoppers, price competition is so enhanced by the
higher endogenous share of shoppers at the cluster relative to µ that the expected price
paid at a cluster store by a consumer who knows he does not have time to comparison shop
falls below that paid by a consumer in the base setting who could turn out to have time to
comparison shop. This means that when µ is small, even a consumer who knows he does
not have time to comparison shop is willing to travel farther than a consumer in the base
setting, i.e., n∗(µ, α) > x(µ, α). However, with enough shoppers, this inequality is reversed—
the heightened value of likely securing the lowest price more than offsets the higher expected
prices that obtain when consumers do not know whether they will have time to shop.
Establishing that n∗(µ, α) > x(µ, α) when µ is small is challenging—we must show that
An(µ
∗(µ)) < A(µ) in an open neighborhood of µ = 0, even though An(µ∗(µ)) = A(µ) at
µ = 0. In effect, we must sign the derivative A′(µ) − A′n(µ∗(µ))dµ
∗(µ)
dµ
at µ = 0. This
is tricky because (1) µ∗ is an equilibrium object, with the properties that limµ→0
µ∗(µ)
µ
=
limµ→0
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
= 1; and (2) limµ→0A′(µ) = limµ→0A′n(µ
∗(µ)) =∞. Thus, to sign the deriva-
tive, one must identify the rates of convergence. A key is to show that 0 < limz→0
√
zA′n(z) <
limz→0
√
zA′s(z) <∞.
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3 What happens if stores can choose where to locate?
Our analysis takes the locations of stores as given. Given the high cost of relocation in
practice, one can imagine that this is the relevant consideration. However, it is worth con-
templating how outcomes are affected when relocation is a possibility. For example, one
can imagine there initially being one store at each location, and then a third store entering,
resulting in two firms at one location, and one at the other. Obviously, if stores L1 and L2
colocate and R is isolated, then L1 and L2 have no incentive to incur the costs c ≥ 0 of relo-
cating with R, as their competitive situation would effectively be unchanged. More germane,
even if relocation is costless, isolation of R can emerge in equilibrium from optimal location
choices for a wide set of parameters: even when L1 and L2 earn higher profits that R due to
their higher share of consumers, R’s profits may be further reduced by joining L1 and L2.
To make this point we return to the setting where consumers do not know their types
before visiting a store. The question becomes: would R want to join stores L1 and L2 at
location 0? Deviating to the cluster increases the surplus consumers receive at the cluster
as price competition intensifies. For simplicity, consider the best case scenario for deviation
to 0 by supposing that if R deviates, then every consumer would visit the cluster. Store R’s
profit would be (1−µ)R
m
3
− c, whereas at location 1 it would receive (1− x∗(α, µ))Rm. Hence,
R is strictly better off at location 1 when x∗(α, µ)) < 2+µ
3
− c
Rm
.
From (2), the co-located stores earn more profits than R at location 1 if x∗(α, µ) > 2
3−µ .
Observing that 2
3−µ <
2+µ
3
, it follows that even if relocation is costless (i.e., c = 0), the
equilibrium profits of L1 and L2 can exceed R’s, but R nonetheless optimally locates at 1.
4 Conclusion
Standard spatial theory suggests that firms selling similar products maximize profits by sep-
arating maximally. Nonetheless, in recent years, stores like Lowes and Home Depot that sell
very similar products have thrived despite co-locating (at fringes), while stores in city centers
that face limited local competition have had troubles. We note that when most consumers
only see prices once they visit a store and some consumers have time to comparison shop
then co-location commits stores to compete and lower prices, which draws more consumers.
Our central finding is that co-located firms thrive when there are some shoppers, but
not too many. With few shoppers, the measure of consumers drawn to the co-located stores
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is very price elastic because travel costs differ only modestly for the marginal consumer.
Thus, the marginal value of commitment to slightly lower prices is high. These effects are
enhanced if consumers know in advance whether they will have time to comparison shop.
Indeed, price competition at co-located stores may rise by enough that the expected price
paid by a non-shopper falls below that paid when consumers do not know if they will have
time to shop. The flip side is that with too many shoppers, price competition grows so fierce
that the high numbers of customers drawn fail to offset the reduced profit per customer.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We first prove two lemmas.
Lemma 3 (i) The consumer surplus gain from visiting the co-located stores rather than store
R is given by equation (1); (ii) A′(µ) > 0 with limµ→0A′(µ) = ∞ and limµ→1A′(µ) = 0;
(iii) A(µ) is strictly concave when demand is linear, D(p) = β1 − β2 p.
Proof: (i) If X1, X2 ∼ iidF , then min{X1, X2} ∼ 1− [1−F (p)]2. Thus, expected consumer
surplus at location 0 is
(1− µ)
∫ ∞
b
F (p)D(p)dp+ µ
∫ ∞
b
[
1− (1− F (p))2]D(p)dp. (9)
Because (1− µ)F + µ [1− (1− F (p))2] = F + µF (1− F ), equation (9) simplifies to∫ pm
b
F (p)D(p)dp+
∫ ∞
pm
D(p)dp+ µ
∫ pm
b
F (p)(1− F (p))D(p)dp− αt(x), (10)
exploiting the fact that F (p) = 1 for p ≥ pm. The expected consumer surplus at location 1 is∫ ∞
pm
D(p)dp. (11)
Subtracting (11) from (10) yields A(µ) in the text.
(ii) Differentiating A(µ) and recognizing that F (b(µ)) = 0, yields:
dA(µ)
dµ
=
∫ pm
b
d[F (p;µ)(1 + µ− µF (p;µ))]
dµ
D(p)dp
=
∫ pm
b
[
dF (p;µ)
dµ
(1 + µ− 2µF (p;µ))
]
D(p)dp+
∫ pm
b
F (p;µ)(1− F (p;µ)) D(p)dp.
From Lemma 1,
dF (p;µ)
dµ
=
1
2µ2
(
Rm
R(p)
− 1
)
=
1− F (p;µ)
µ(1− µ) > 0. (12)
Thus,
dA(µ)
dµ
=
∫ pm
b
(1− F (p))
(
1 + µ− 2µF (p)
µ(1− µ) + F (p)
)
D(p)dp
=
∫ pm
b
(1− F (p))
(
1 + µ− 2µF (p) + µF (p)− µ2F (p)
µ(1− µ)
)
D(p)dp
=
∫ pm
b
(1− F (p))
(
1 + µ− µ(1 + µ)F (p)
µ(1− µ)
)
D(p)dp.
=
1 + µ
µ(1− µ)
∫ pm
b(µ)
(1− F (p))(1− µF (p)) D(p)dp > 0.
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Next, we show that limµ→0A′(µ) =∞.
lim
µ→0
dA(µ)
dµ
= lim
µ→0
1
µ
∫ pm
b(µ)
(1− F (p)) D(p)dp. (13)
Applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule yields
lim
µ→0
A′(µ) = lim
µ→0
d
dµ
∫ pm
b(µ)
(1− F (p)) D(p)dp
= lim
µ→0
−[1− F (b(µ))] D[b(µ)] b′(µ)− lim
µ→0
∫ pm
b(µ)
dF (p;µ)
dµ
D(p)dp
= −D(pm) lim
µ→0
b′(µ)− lim
µ→0
A′(µ) (using (13) and (12)).
Thus,
lim
µ→0
dA(µ)
dµ
= −D(p
m)
2
lim
µ→0
b′(µ).
From Lemma 1,
lim
µ→0
b′(µ) = lim
µ→0
− 2Rm
(1+µ)2
R′(b(µ))
= lim
µ→0
−2Rm
R′(b(µ))
= −∞, (14)
because pm is an interior maximum, and hence as p→ pm from the left, R′(p) approaches 0
from above. Combining these results yields
lim
µ→0
A′(µ) =∞.
A similar application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule yields
lim
µ→1
A′(µ) = 0.
(iii) We take the second derivative of A(µ), given linear demand D(p) = β1−β2p. Math-
ematica calculations yield
A(µ) =
β21
4β2
4µ2 +
√
2µ(1 + µ)(1 + 3µ)− (1− µ)2 tanh−1
(√
2µ
1+µ
)
8µ
.
Moreover,
dA(µ)
dµ
=
(
β21
4β2
)2
1
18µ2
{ √
2µ
1 + µ
(−2 + 3µ+ 7µ2) + 8µ2 + 2(1− µ2) tanh−1
(√
2µ
1 + µ
) }
.
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Next, we show d
2A(µ)
dµ2
< 0.
18
(
β21
4β2
)−2
d2A(µ)
dµ2
=
√(
µ
1+µ
)3 {√
2µ(8 + 9µ+ 3µ2)− 8
√
µ
1+µ
(1 + µ)2 tanh−1
(√
2µ
1+µ
)}
2µ5
It suffices to show that the curly bracket is negative. To show this, we observe that a Taylor
expansion together with strict concavity of tanh−1(µ) for µ > 0 imply that
tanh−1(µ) > µ+
µ3
3
, for µ > 0.
Substituting µ+ µ
3
3
for tanh−1(µ) yields
√
2µ(8 + 9µ+ 3µ2)− 8
√
µ
1 + µ
(1 + µ)2 tanh−1
(√
2µ
1 + µ
)
<
√
2µ(8 + 9µ+ 3µ2)− 8
√
µ
1 + µ
(1 + µ)2
(√
2µ
1 + µ
+
1
3
(√
2µ
1 + µ
)3)
=
√
2
3
µ2(9µ− 13) < 0.
Thus, d
2A(µ)
dµ2
< 0 for µ ∈ (0, 1). 
Lemma 4 For x∗ < 1, x∗(µ) is a strictly increasing function of µ, with limµ→0
dx∗(µ)
dµ
= ∞
and limµ→1
dx∗(µ)
dµ
= 0. If demand is linear, then x∗(µ) is strictly concave.
Proof: Recall that α T (x∗(µ)) = A(µ) when x∗ < 1. Thus,
dx∗(µ)
dµ
=
1
α T ′(x∗(µ))
dA(µ)
dµ
> 0, (15)
and
d2x∗(µ)
dµ2
=
1
T ′(x∗(µ))
(
1
α
d2A(µ)
dµ2
− T ′′(x∗(µ))
(
dx∗(µ)
dµ
)2)
, (16)
Moreover, T ′′(x) = t′′(x)− t′′(1− x). Because t′′′(x) ≥ 0 and x∗ ≥ 1/2, we have T ′′(x∗) ≥ 0.
The results then follow from Lemma 3. 
We now these lemmas to prove Proposition 1.
Part 1 of Proposition 1. Observe that
dpiL(µ)
dµ
=
Rm
2
(
dx∗(µ)
dµ
(1− µ)− x∗(µ)
)
. (17)
16
Thus, using Lemma 4,
lim
µ→0
dpiL(µ)
dµ
=
Rm
2
(
lim
µ→0
dx∗(µ)
dµ
− x∗(0)
)
=∞
lim
µ→1
dpiL(µ)
dµ
=
Rm
2
(0− x∗(1)) < 0.
Moreover, differentiating (17),
d2piL(µ)
dµ2
=
Rm
2
(
d2x∗(µ)
dµ2
(1− µ)− 2 dx
∗(µ)
dµ
)
.
From Lemma 4, x∗(µ) increases in µ. Thus, for µ sufficiently small that x∗(µ) < 1, from
Lemma 4, with linear demand, d
2x∗(µ)
dµ2
< 0, and hence d
2piL(µ)
dµ2
< 0. Otherwise, x∗(µ) = 1,
and thus d
2piL(µ)
dµ2
= 0.
Part 2 of Proposition 1. At α(µ), x(µ, α(µ)) = 2/(3 − µ). By the implicit function
theorem (evaluated at x∗(µ, α))
α′(µ) =
1
∂x∗/∂α
(
2
(3− µ)2 −
∂x∗
∂µ
)
. (18)
We claim that α′(µ) satisfies a single crossing property: α′(µ) > 0 for µ < µ˜, and α′(µ) < 0
for µ > µ˜.
To see this, first notice that in equilibrium x∗(µ, α) = T−1 (A(µ)/α), and thus
∂x∗(µ, α)
∂α
= − A(µ)
α2T ′(A(µ)/α)
< 0,
since T ′(x) > 0. Moreover, dx∗(x, α)/dµ > 0 (from (15)), and when A(µ) is concave and
T (x) is convex, we have d2x∗(x, α)/dµ2 < 0 (from (16)).
Thus, the denominator in (18) is negative such that α′(µ) > 0 if 2/(3−µ)2−∂x∗/∂µ < 0;
and α′(µ) < 0 otherwise. The first term 2/(3−µ)2 increases in µ, while ∂x∗/∂µ decreases in µ
(since d2x∗/dµ2 < 0). Thus, 2/(3−µ)2−∂x∗/∂µ increases in µ: if 2/(3−µ˜)2−∂x∗/∂µ|µ=µ˜ = 0
at µ˜, then 2/(3−µ)2− ∂x∗/∂µ < 0 for all µ < µ˜, and 2/(3−µ)2− ∂x∗/∂µ > 0 for all µ > µ˜.
For µ ≈ 0, we have α′(µ) > 0, since ∂x∗/∂µ → ∞ (from (15)) and 2/(3− µ)2 → 2/9 as
µ→ 0. If µ˜ ∈ (0, 1), then α(µ) increases for µ < µ˜, peaks at µ˜, and decreases for µ > µ˜. If
µ˜ /∈ (0, 1), then α′(µ) > 0 for all µ and the peak is reached at µ = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2: From equation (5),
s(µ′, α)
n(µ′, α)
=
α + As(µ
′)
α + An(µ′)
. (19)
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From equation (6),
s(µ′, α)
n(µ′, α)
=
µ′ (1− µ)
(1− µ′)µ. (20)
Combining equations (19) and (20) yields that µ′ is consistent with equilibrium if and only if
g (µ′;α, µ) =
µ′
1− µ′
1− µ
µ
− α + As (µ
′)
α + An (µ′)
= 0.
Observe that g (0;α, µ) < 0 < g (1;α, µ). Thus, at least one solution exists. To show that
the solution is unique, we prove that ∂g (µ′;α, µ) /∂µ′ > 0.
Lemma 5 ∂g (µ′;α, µ) /∂µ′ > 0.
Proof: Since s(µ′, α) ≥ n(µ′, α), Bayes rules (6) implies µ′ ≥ µ. Moreover, from Lemma 1
dF (p;µ′)
dµ′
=
1− F (µ′)
µ′(1− µ′) . (21)
Next, recall that from equations (3) and (4),
As(µ
′) =
∫ pm
b(µ′)
[F (p;µ′) + F (p;µ′)(1− F (p;µ′)]D(p)dp (22)
> An(µ
′) =
∫ pm
b(µ′)
F (p;µ′) D(p)dp > 0. (23)
Differentiating (23) with respect to µ′, and using (21), yields:
A′n(µ
′) =
∫ pm
b(µ′)
1− F (p;µ′)
µ′(1− µ′) D(p)dp, (24)
using F (b(µ′);µ′) = 0. Similarly from (21) and (22),
A′s(µ
′) =
∫ pm
b(µ′)
2
dF (p;µ′)
dµ′
(1− F (µ′))D(p)dp = 2
∫ pm
b(µ′)
(1− F (p;µ′))2
µ′(1− µ′) D(p)dp. (25)
Moreover, from (24) and (25)
2A′n(µ
′)− A′s(µ′) = 2
∫ pm
b(µ′)
dF (p;µ′)
dµ′
F (µ′)D(p)dp > 0. (26)
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Combining these results, yields
∂g (µ′;α, µ)
∂µ′
=
1− µ
(1− µ′)2 µ +
(α + As (µ
′))A′n (µ
′)− (α + An (µ′))A′s (µ′)
(α + An (µ′))
2 (27)
>
1− µ
(1− µ′)2 µ +
(α + An (µ
′))A′n (µ
′)− (α + An (µ′))A′s (µ′)
(α + An (µ′))
2 (from (23))
=
1− µ
(1− µ′)2 µ +
A′n (µ
′)− A′s (µ′)
α + An (µ′)
>
1− µ
(1− µ′)2 µ −
A′n (µ
′)
α + An (µ′)
(from (26))
>
1− µ
(1− µ′)2 µ −
A′n (µ
′)
An (µ′)
(because α > 0)
≥ 1− µ
′
(1− µ′)2 µ′ −
A′n (µ
′)
An (µ′)
(because µ′ ≥ µ)
=
1
(1− µ′)µ′ −
A′n (µ
′)
An (µ′)
. (28)
Now, combining (23) and (24) yields:
A′n(µ
′)
An(µ′)
=
1
µ′(1− µ′)
∫ pm
b(µ′)(1− F (p;µ′)) D(p)dp∫ pm
b(µ′) F (p;µ
′) D(p)dp
. (29)
Comparing (29) and (28) reveals that ∂g (µ′;α, µ) /∂µ′ > 0 if∫ pm
b(µ′)
F (p;µ′) D(p)dp ≥
∫ pm
b(µ′)
(1− F (p;µ′)) D(p)dp. (30)
To see that (30) holds for µ′ > 0, substitute F (p;µ′) = 1− (1−µ′)
2µ′ (R
m/R(p)−1) and re-arrange
it as ∫ pm
b(µ′)
D(p)dp−
(
1− µ′
µ′
) ∫ pm
b(µ′)
(
Rm
R(p)
− 1
)
D(p)dp ≥ 0.
Substitute R(p) = pD(p), re-arrange and multiply through by µ′ > 0 to obtain∫ pm
b(µ′)
D(p)dp−Rm (1− µ′)
∫ pm
b(µ′)
1
p
dp ≥ 0.
Integrating the last term yields
h(µ′) =
∫ pm
b(µ′)
D(p)dp−Rm (1− µ′) (ln(pm)− ln(b(µ′))) ≥ 0. (31)
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Lemma 6 For z > 0 define h(z) =
∫ pm
b(z)
D(p)dp − Rm (1− z) ( ln(pm) − ln(b(z)) ), with
R(b(z)) = 1−z
1+z
Rm. Then,
1. limz→0 h(z) = limz→0 h′(z) = 0.
2. h′′(z) > 0 for z > 0.
Proof: From the definition of b(z), limz→0 b(z) = pm. Thus,
lim
z→0
h(z) =
∫ pm
pm
D(p)dp−Rm ( ln(pm)− ln(pm) ) = 0.
Differentiating h(z) with respect to z,
h′(z) = −b′(z)D(b(z)) +Rm( ln(pm)− ln(b(z)) )+Rm(1− z)b′(z)
b(z)
.
Recall that R(p) = pD(p). Thus, D(b(z)) = 1
b(z)
1−z
1+z
Rm. Substituting for D(b(z)) yields
h′(z) = Rm
(
ln(pm)− ln(b(z)) +
(
1− z
1 + z
)
z b′(z)
b(z)
)
. (32)
As z → 0, we have
lim
z→0
h′(z) =
Rm
pm
lim
z→0
zb′(z)
=
Rm
pm
lim
z→0
z
1
R′(b(z))
−2Rm
(1 + z)2
(from definition of b′(z) in (14))
=
−2(Rm)2
pm
lim
z→0
1
R′′(b(z)) b′(z)
(by L’Hoˆpital’s Rule)
=
−2(Rm)2
pm
lim
z→0
R′(b(z))
R′′(b(z))
(1 + z)2
−2Rm (from definition of b
′(z) in (14))
= D(pm)
R′(pm)
R′′(pm)
= 0.
This concludes part 1.
For part 2, differentiating (32) yields
h′′(z)/Rm = −b
′(z)
b(z)
+
1− 2z − z2
(1 + z)2
b′(z)
b(z)
+
z(1− z)
1 + z
(
b′′(z)
b(z)
− b
′(z)2
b(z)2
)
=
−2z(2 + z)b′(z)b(z)− z(1− z2)b′(z)2 + z(1− z2)b′′(z)b(z)
(1 + z)2b(z)2
.
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Let N(z) be the numerator. It suffices to show that N(z) > 0. Observe that
b′(z) = − 2R
m
(1 + z)2R′(b(z))
< 0 < b′′(z) = 2Rm
(
2R′(b(z)) + (1 + z)b′(z)R′′(b(z))
(1 + z)3R′(b(z))2
)
. (33)
Substitute for b′(z) and b′′(z) in N(z) and simplifying yields
N(z) ∝ bR
′(b)
R(b)
− 1
3
− 1
3
bR′′(b)
R′(b)
.
Thus, if bR′(b)/R(b) > 1/3, then N(z) > 0. Now, recall that R′(p) = D(p) (1 + ), where
 = pD′(p)/D(p) is the price elasticity of demand. Thus, bR′(b)/R(b) > 1/3 is equivalent to
 = bD′(b)/D(b) > −2/3. By our assumptions that R(p) is concave with a maximum at pm,
we already have  > −1. The weaker necessary and sufficient condition for N(z) > 0 is
3bR′(b)2 −R(b)R′(b)− bR(b)R′′(b) > 0, (34)
which is less strict than requiring pR′(p)/R(p)2 to be decreasing as in Stahl (1989). Stahl’s
requirement (our Assumption 2) that pR′(p)/R(p)2 be decreasing in p for p < pm implies that
2pR′(p)2 −R(p)R′(p)− pR(p)R′′(p) > 0. (35)
Since b < pm, (34) is implied by (35). 
Lemma 6 implies that h(µ′) > 0 for all µ′ > 0 and h(µ′) = 0 for µ′ = 0, which, in turn,
implies ∂g(µ;α, µ)/∂µ′ > 0 for all µ ≥ 0. Thus, a unique equilibrium cutoff µ∗(µ, α) exists.
The comparative statics with respect to µ are:
∂µ∗(µ, α)
∂µ
= − ∂g/∂µ
∂g/∂µ′
∣∣∣∣
µ′=µ∗(µ,α)
=
µ∗/((1− µ∗)µ2)
∂g/∂µ′|µ′=µ∗(µ,α) > 0 (since ∂g/∂µ
′ > 0). (36)
Since As(µ
′) and An(µ′) strictly increase in µ′, s(µ∗(µ), α) and n(µ∗(µ), α) increase in µ.
The comparative statics with respect to α are:
∂µ∗(µ, α)
∂α
= − ∂g/∂α
∂g/∂µ′
∣∣∣∣
µ′=µ∗(µ,α)
= −(As(µ
∗)− An(µ∗))/(α + An(µ∗))2
∂g/∂µ′|µ′=µ∗(µ,α) < 0,
because we have established that ∂g/∂µ′ > 0 and As(µ)−An(µ) > 0. From (5), s(µ∗(α), α) =
1/2 + As(µ
∗(α))/2α and n(µ∗(α), α) = 1/2 + An(µ∗(α))/2α. Because µ∗(α) decreases in α
and As(µ) and An(µ) both increase in µ,
∂s(µ∗(α), α)
∂α
,
∂n(µ∗(α), α)
∂α
< 0.
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Finally, in equilibrium s(µ
∗(α),α)
n(µ∗(α),α) =
µ∗(α)
1−µ∗(α)
1−µ
µ
from Bayes rule (6). Thus,
∂s(µ∗(α), α)/n(µ∗(α), α)
∂α
=
(1− µ)
µ(1− µ∗)2
∂µ∗(α)
∂α
< 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3: We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 7 (i) limµ→0
µ∗(µ)
µ
= 1 and limµ→1
µ∗
µ
= 1. (ii) limµ→0
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
= limµ→1
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
= 1.
Proof: (i) Because n, s ∈ [1/2, 1], from (6), limµ→0 µ∗(µ) = 0 and limµ→1 µ∗(µ) = 1. More-
over, limµ→0 n(µ∗(µ))/s(µ∗(µ)) = n(0)/s(0) =
1/2
1/2
= 1. Thus,
lim
µ→0
µ∗(µ)
µ
= lim
µ→0
1
µ+ (1− µ)(n(µ∗(µ))/s(µ∗(µ))) =
1
n(0)/s(0)
= 1.
(ii) Because limz→0 b(z) = pm, from (24) and (25),
lim
z→0
zA′n(z) = lim
z→0
∫ pm
b(z)
(1− F (p; z))
1− z D(p)dp = 0
(37)
lim
z→0
zA′s(z) = 2 lim
z→0
∫ pm
b(z)
(1− F (p; z))2
1− z D(p)dp = 0.
Moreover, substituting from (27) into (36) yields
lim
µ→0
∂µ∗(µ, α)
∂µ
= lim
µ→0
µ∗
1−µ∗
1
µ2
1−µ
µ(1−µ∗)2 − (α+An(µ
∗))A′s(µ∗)−(α+As(µ∗))A′n(µ∗)
(α+An(µ∗))2
(38)
= lim
µ→0
(µ∗/µ)2
µ∗/µ− µ∗ (A′s(µ∗)− A′n(µ∗)) /α
(since An(0) = As(0) = 0)
= lim
µ→0
1
1− µ∗(A′s(µ∗)− A′n(µ∗))/α
(since limµ→0 µ∗/µ = 1 from part (i))
= 1 (from (37)).
The result for µ→ 1 is analogous, and uses limz→1(1−z)A′s(z) = limz→1(1−z)A′n(z) = 0. 
Part 1. From (7),
∂piL
∂µ
=
Rm
2
(
(1− µ) ∂n(µ
∗(µ), α)
∂µ∗
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
− n(µ∗, α)
)
. (39)
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We first show that limµ→0 ∂piL∂µ > 0. From (5), ∂n(µ
∗(µ), α)/∂µ′ = A′n(µ
∗)/2α. From
part (i) of Lemma 7, limµ→0 n(µ∗(µ), α) = n(0, α) = 1/2. From part (ii) of Lemma 7,
limµ→0
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
= 1. Substituting these into equation (39) yields
lim
µ→0
∂piL
∂µ
=
Rm
2
(
lim
µ→0
A′n(µ
∗)
2α
− 1
2
)
.
Thus, it suffices to show that limµ→0
A′n(µ∗)
2α
=∞. From part (i) of Lemma 7,
lim
µ→0
A′n(µ
∗(µ)) = lim
µ→0
A′n(µ) = lim
µ→0
∫ pm
b(µ)
(1− F (p;µ))
µ(1− µ) D(p)dp (by (24))
= lim
µ→0
∫ pm
b(µ)
(1− F (p;µ))
µ
D(p)dp)
=∞ (by (13).
Next, consider µ→ 1. From part (i) of Lemma 7, limµ→1 µ∗ = 1. Thus, limµ→1 n(µ∗, α) =
n(1, α) ≥ 1/2. Moreover, from (5), ∂n(µ∗, α)/∂µ∗ = A′n(µ∗)/2α. Thus,
lim
µ→1
∂piL
∂µ
=
Rm
2
(
lim
µ→1
(1− µ)A
′
n(µ)
2α
− n(1, α)
)
.
Now, from (24),
lim
µ→1
(1− µ)A′n(µ) = lim
µ→1
∫ pm
b(µ)
(1− F (p;µ))D(p)dp
µ
= 0 (by (24) and Lemma 1).
Thus,
lim
µ→1
∂piL
∂µ
= −R
m
2
n(1, α) < 0.
Part 2. First, we prove the case of µ ≈ 0. Then, we prove the case of µ ≈ 1.
Case of µ ≈ 0. We show that there exists  > 0 such that if µ ∈ (0, ), then A(µ) −
An(µ
∗(µ)) < 0. Observe that A(0)− An(µ∗(0)) = 0. Thus, it suffices to show that
lim
µ→0
{
∆(µ) ≡ A′(µ)− A′n(µ∗)
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
}
< 0. (40)
From (1), (3), and (4), we have:
A(µ) = µAs(µ) + (1− µ)An(µ), (41)
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which implies
A′(µ) = As(µ)− An(µ) + µA′s(µ) + (1− µ)A′n(µ). (42)
Substituting from (42) into (40), we have:
∆(µ) = As(µ)− An(µ) + µ(A′s(µ)− A′n(µ)) + A′n(µ)− A′n(µ∗)
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
. (43)
Next, we substitute for dµ
∗(µ)
dµ
into (43) and simplify. From equations (36) and (38),
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
= − ∂g/∂µ
∂g/∂µ′
∣∣∣∣
µ′=µ∗(µ,α)
=
µ∗
1−µ∗
1
µ2
1−µ
µ(1−µ∗)2 − (α+An(µ
∗))A′s(µ∗)−(α+As(µ∗))A′n(µ∗)
(α+An(µ∗))2
. (44)
To ease exposition, we define δ(µ) to be the denominator of the above expression:
δ(µ) ≡ ∂g
∂µ′
∣∣∣∣
µ′=µ∗(µ,α)
=
(1− µ)
µ(1− µ∗)2 +
(α + As(µ
∗))A′n(µ
∗)− (α + An(µ∗))A′s(µ∗)
(α + An(µ∗))2
.
Using (37), and limµ→0
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
= 1 and limµ→0
µ∗(µ)
µ
= 1 from Lemma 7, we have:
lim
µ→0
µ∗δ(µ) = 1. (45)
Next, substitute equation (44) into (43), and use δ(µ) to obtain:
δ(µ) ∆(µ) = δ(µ) { As(µ)− An(µ) + µ(A′s(µ)− A′n(µ)) }
+
1− µ
µ(1− µ∗)2 A
′
n(µ)−
µ∗
1− µ∗
1
µ2
A′n(µ
∗)
− A′n(µ)
(α + An(µ
∗))A′s(µ
∗)− (α + As(µ∗))A′n(µ∗)
(α + An(µ∗))2
(46)
Our goal is to show that limµ→0 δ(µ) ∆(µ) < 0. From (41), limµ→0An(µ) = limµ→0As(µ) = 0.
From (37), limµ→0 µA′n(µ) = limµ→0 µA
′
s(µ) = 0. Thus, (46) simplifies to:
lim
µ→0
µ∗δ(µ) ∆(µ) = lim
µ→0
{
µ∗
1− µ
µ(1− µ∗)2 A
′
n(µ)−
µ∗2
1− µ∗
1
µ2
A′n(µ
∗)
}
− lim
µ→0
µ∗ A′n(µ)
(α + An(µ
∗))A′s(µ
∗)− (α + As(µ∗))A′n(µ∗)
(α + An(µ∗))2
.
Rearranging µ∗ terms, write limµ→0 µ∗δ(µ)∆(µ) as:
lim
µ→0
{
µ∗(1− µ)
µ(1− µ∗)2 A
′
n(µ)−
1
1− µ∗
(
µ∗
µ
)2
A′n(µ
∗)
}
− lim
µ→0
√
µ∗
µ
√
µ A′n(µ)
(α + An(µ
∗))
√
µ∗A′s(µ
∗)− (α + As(µ∗))√µ∗A′n(µ∗)
(α + An(µ∗))2
. (47)
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Lemma 8 below shows that limz→0
√
z A′n(z) = Kn and limz→0
√
z A′s(z) = Ks, with
0 < Kn < Ks. Moreover, recall from part (i) of Lemma 7 that limµ→0
µ∗(µ)
µ
= 1. Thus,
(47) simplifies to:
lim
µ→0
µ∗δ(µ) ∆(µ) = lim
µ→0
{
µ∗(1− µ)
µ(1− µ∗)2 A
′
n(µ)−
1
1− µ∗
(
µ∗
µ
)2
A′n(µ
∗)
}
− Kn(Ks −Kn)
α
≤ lim
µ→0
{
µ∗
µ(1− µ∗)
(
A′n(µ)−
(
µ∗
µ
)
A′n(µ
∗)
)}
− Kn(Ks −Kn)
α
= lim
µ→0
{
µ∗
µ2(1− µ∗)
(
µ A′n(µ)− µ∗ A′n(µ∗)
)}
− Kn(Ks −Kn)
α
.
Lemma 9 below shows that zA′(z) is increasing when z is sufficiently small. This together
with µ∗ ≥ µ and limµ→0 µ∗/µ = 1 implies that µ A′n(µ)− µ∗ A′n(µ∗) ≤ 0. Thus,
lim
µ→0
µ∗δ(µ) ∆(µ) < −Kn(Ks −Kn)
α
< 0 ⇒ lim
µ→0
δ(µ)∆(µ) = −∞.
Lemma 8 (i) limz→0
√
z b′(z) = −2Rm K0, where 0 < K0 <∞, (ii) limz→0
√
z A′n(z) = Kn
and limz→0
√
z A′s(z) = Ks, with 0 < Kn < Ks <∞ and Kn = 43 Rm D(pm) K0.
Proof: (i) Define Kz ≡
√
z/R′(b(z)). Then,
lim
z→0
Kz = lim
z→0
√
z
R′(b(z))
= lim
z→0
1
2
√
zR′′(b(z))b′(z)
(by L’Hoˆpital’s Rule)
= lim
z→0
1
2R′′(b(z))(− 2
√
zRm
(1+z)2R′(b(z′)))
= − lim
z→0
1
4RmR′′(b(z))Kz
.
Cross-multiplying by Kz and then taking the square root to solve for Kz yields:
lim
z→0
Kz =
(
− 1
4RmR′′(pm)
)1/2
= K0 > 0,
since R′′(pm) < 0. Thus,
lim
z→0
√
z b′(z) = lim
z→0
√
z
−2Rm
(1 + z)2
1
R′(b(z))
= −2Rm K0.
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(ii) We have
lim
z→0
√
zA′n(z) =
1√
z
∫ pm
b(z)
(1− F (p; z))D(p)dp (by (24))
= lim
z→0
−b′(z) (1− F (b(z); z)) D(b(z)) + ∫ pm
b(z)
∂(1−F (p;z))
∂z
D(p)dp
1/2 (z−1/2)
= lim
z→0
2
√
z
(
−b′(z) D(pm)−
∫ pm
b(z)
1− F (p; z)
z(1− z) D(p)dp
)
= lim
z→0
−2√z b′(z) D(pm)− 2 lim
z→0
√
zA′n(z).
Thus,
Kn ≡ lim
z→0
√
zA′n(z) =
4
3
Rm D(pm) K0 (by part (i)).
By an analogous argument, Ks ≡ limz→0
√
zA′s(z) =
8
5
RmD(pm)K0 > Kn. 
Lemma 9 limz→0
d(zA′n(z))
dz
> 0.
Proof: From equation (37),
d(zA′n(z))
dz
= −b′(z) D(b(z))
1− z +
∫ pm
b(z)
1− F (p; z)
(1− z)2 D(p)dp−
∫ pm
b(z)
1− F (p; z)
z(1− z)2 D(p)dp
=
1
1− z
(
−b′(z) D(b(z)) +
∫ pm
b(z)
1− F (p; z)
1− z − A
′
n(z)
)
,
where we have used (21) and (24). Thus,
lim
z→0
d(zA′n(z))
dz
= − lim
z→0
{ b′(z) D(pm) + A′n(z) }
= − lim
z→0
√
z b′(z) D(pm) +
√
z A′n(z)√
z
= − lim
z→0
1√
z
(
−2RmK0D(pm) + 4
3
Rm D(pm) K0
)
(by Lemma 8)
= lim
z→0
1√
z
2
3
RmD(pm)K0 =∞.

Case of µ ≈ 1. We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 10 0 < limz→1A′s(z) < limz→1A
′
n(z) =∞.
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Proof: From (25),
lim
z→1
A′s(z) = lim
z→1
2
∫ pm
b(z)
(1− F (p; z))2D(p)dp
z(1− z)
= lim
z→1
2
[∫ pm
b(z)
−2∂F (p; z)
∂z
(1− F (p; z))D(p)dp
1− 2z −
b′(z)D(b(z))
1− 2z
]
(by L’Hoˆpital’s Rule)
= lim
z→1
[−2A′s(z)− 2b′(z)D(b(z))
1− 2z
]
(by (22))
= lim
z→1
[2A′s(z) + 2b
′(z)D(b(z))]
Thus, using b′ from equation (33),
lim
z→1
A′s(z) = −2 lim
z→1
b′(z)D(b(z)) =
RmD(b(1))
R′(b(1))
<∞.
Similarly, from (24)
lim
z→1
A′n(z) = lim
z→1
∫ pm
b(z)
(1− F (p; z))D(p)dp
z(1− z)
= lim
z→1
∫ pm
b(z)
(
1− 1 + 1−z
2z
(
Rm
pD(p)
− 1
))
D(p)dp
z(1− z) (by Lemma 1)
= lim
z→1
∫ pm
b(z)
1
2z2
(
Rm
p
−D(p)
)
= lim
z→1
[
1
2z2
(
Rm ln
(
pm
b(z)
)
−
∫ pm
b(z)
D(p)dp
)]
=∞ (by limz→1 b(z) = 0 and
∫ pm
0
D(p)dp <∞). 
Now, because A(1)− An(µ∗(1)) = 0, it suffices to show that
lim
µ→1
{
∆(µ) ≡ A′(µ)− A′n(µ∗)
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
}
< 0.
From (42) and limµ→1(1−µ)A′n(µ) = 0, we have limµ→1A′(µ) = limµ→1A′s(µ). From Lemma
7, limµ→1 dµ∗/dµ = 1. From Lemma 10 above, 0 < limz→1A′s(z) < limz→1A
′
n(z) =∞. Com-
bining these results, we have
lim
µ→1
∆(µ, µ∗(µ)) = lim
µ→1
[
A′s(µ)− A′n(µ∗)
dµ∗(µ)
dµ
]
= −∞,
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3. 
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